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Apple Inc. v. Pepper involved fundamental issues related to consumers’ 
relationships with mobile marketplace platforms and long-standing doctrines 
regarding standing to file suit under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Nevertheless, the 
facts of this case are not complicated: The plaintiff represented the purchasers 
of iPhone applications (“Apps”) from Apple Inc.’s (“Apple”) marketplace 
interface for the sale of Apps (“App Store”).1 The App Store came preloaded on 
all the iPhones purchased by the consumers represented in the suit 
(“Consumers”).2 The Consumers alleged they were overcharged for the Apps 
they purchased as a result of Apple’s monopoly, and they sought treble damages 
for the relevant overcharges.3 
In response, Apple argued that the Consumers lacked standing under the 
direct purchaser doctrine4 articulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois.5 According to Apple, the direct purchasers of the App Store 
services were the App developers who utilized the App Store to sell their own 
Apps to the Consumers.6 Consequently, the Consumers were only indirect 
purchasers when they were purchasing the App Store service indirectly through 
their purchases of the Apps from the App developers. These developers are the 
ones who may or may not have passed on the monopolistic overcharges from 
Apple. This argument presented by Apple raised substantial issues with respect 
to the proper definition of a “purchaser” within the field of internet intermediary 
platforms, as well as a question as to whether the direct purchaser doctrine 
articulated in Illinois Brick should be revisited and revised. 
I. ISSUES PRESENTED IN APPLE INC. V. PEPPER 
Within Apple Inc. v. Pepper, broadly speaking, there are two issues of major 
importance.  First, are the Consumers direct or indirect purchasers of Apps from 
Apple’s App Store based on the Illinois Brick precedent?7 This is the core issue 
in dispute between Apple and the Consumers.  Second, should the direct 
purchaser doctrine from Illinois Brick, which prohibits pass-through damages 
for antitrust cases, be modified or entirely overruled?8 The issue of revisiting 
                                                          
 1 Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019). 
 2 See id. at 1519. 
 3 Id. at 1520. 
 4 Id. at 1519. 
 5 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735-36 (1977). 
 6 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) 
(No. 17-204). 
 7 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1520-21 (2019). 
 8 See id. 
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Illinois Brick was raised by the amicus briefs and argued between the amici.9 
During oral arguments, Justices Alito and Gorsuch highlighted the need to revisit 
the Illinois Brick issue.10 Furthermore, while the reevaluation of Illinois Brick 
was not addressed directly within the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion 
construed the majority opinion as moving away from Illinois Brick without a 
proper adversarial process.11 
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUES AND PRIOR LAW 
This case is significant from both a practical and a theoretical standpoint. Its 
practical significance comes from the business model Apple utilizes, which is a 
prevalent business model for internet retailers: Apple provides an intermediary 
platform and charges a fee for every transaction that utilizes its platform.12 
Dominant companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon, as well as countless 
others, are using this type of model.13 The value proposition of these 
marketplaces is that the marketplace acts merely as a conduit between buyers 
and sellers, and for this service the marketplace operator receives a commission 
on every transaction in the marketplace. This type of service has a tendency to 
create a natural monopoly because, in such a marketplace, the value of the 
marketplace increases as the number of buyers and sellers increases.14 For every 
additional buyer, the marketplace becomes more valuable to every seller and 
vice versa, which leads toward a single marketplace within a specific domain.15 
In that vein, the case of Apple Inc. v. Pepper relates to the practical question of 
whether, through the internal structure of the marketplace operator or through 
agreements with market participants, an internet marketplace operator can limit 
its antitrust litigation exposure to those market participants that are least likely 
to instigate litigation. 
In these intermediary marketplace structures, it may be possible to limit 
antitrust standing to the market participant who is least likely to litigate or the 
                                                          
 9 See id. at 1531 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 10 See id. at 1515-31; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 15-17, 48. 
 11 See Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1515-31; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 14. 
 12 Christina Bonnington, 5 Years On, the App Store Has Forever Changed the Face of 
Software, WIRED (July 10, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/07/five-years-of-
the-app-store/. 
 13 Tony Owusu, App Store Wars: Why Apple, Google Are Upping App Developer Pay, 
THE STREET (June 9, 2016, 3:45 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13602896/1/app-
store-wars-why-apple-google-are-upping-app-developer-pay.html. 
 14 Peter Cao, App Store Sees Massive Growth, Generated 93% More Revenue than 
Google Pay in Q3, 9TO5MAC (Oct. 11, 2018, 11:16 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2018/10/11/ 
app-store-massive-revenue-growth-over-google-play/. 
 15 Jonathan Vanian, Mobile App Store Spending Topped $100 Billion in 2018, FORTUNE 
(Jan. 16, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/01/16/mobile-app-billions-spending/. 
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market participant that shares in the monopolistic profits and lacks any damages 
to bring suit; this would eviscerate private enforcement of antitrust laws.16 
Likewise, class action litigation can be defeated if the market participants who 
have standing to sue lack commonality in the types of injuries they suffered or 
are compelled to sign a contract with an arbitration clause.17 Naturally, the broad 
issue of antitrust liability for an operator of an internet marketplace may also be 
phrased in a manner which is sensitive to Apple’s concerns: Are operators of 
internet marketplaces, who act as conduits between buyers and sellers, protected 
from duplicative damages and inconsistent legal obligations which may arise 
when they are sued by both the buyers and the sellers relating to the same 
commission? 
The practical effect of limiting standing to either solely the buyers or the 
sellers in a marketplace is that it may prevent an outside individual from bringing 
a private cause of action. This issue has been discussed by Justice Scalia in his 
seminal paper on prudential standing titled “The Doctrine of Standing as an 
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers.”18 This reality that there may not 
be a plaintiff to enforce the private right transforms the substance of the 
discussion herein from “who is the proper person to enforce the antitrust laws” 
to “whether those laws can be enforced at all” through private litigation. In 
considering the aforementioned issues, it is also necessary to be aware of the 
risk of agency capture and the immense political power wielded by monopolists. 
Therefore, the debate presented within Apple Inc. v. Pepper takes on a great 
political significance as well as a practical one beyond the purely theoretical 
reasoning undertaken by scholars, lawyers, and judges.19 
Nevertheless, despite the practical importance of Apple Inc.  v. Pepper, this 
case must be analyzed primarily through the application of legal precedent and 
legal theory. The case that is most factually similar to Apple Inc. v. Pepper is 
Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp.20 The Ticketmaster decision involved a situation 
where Ticketmaster was, similarly to Apple, running a marketplace as an 
intermediary between consumers and concert venues.21 In that case, the United 
                                                          
 16 Kate Patrick, Congress Is ‘Fed Up’ with Big Tech, but Antitrust Action May Be 
Impossible, INSIDESOURCES (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.insidesources.com/congress-is-
fed-up-with-big-tech-but-antitrust-action-may-be-impossible/. 
 17 CTR. FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY, FACT SHEET: CASES TOSSED OUT OF COURT 
BECAUSE OF FORCED ARBITRATION CAUSES AND CLASS ACTION BANS 1 (2019), 
https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-cases-tossed-out-court-because-forced-arbitration-
causes-and-class-action-bans. 
 18 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 890 (1983). 
 19 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 20 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1168-74 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 21 Id. at 1168-69. 
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States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sided with Ticketmaster in 
determining that consumers are not direct purchasers of Ticketmaster’s services, 
and, consequently, the consumers in the case did not have standing to file an 
antitrust suit.22 However, despite noting the decision in Ticketmaster, in deciding 
Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the Consumers were direct purchasers of Apple’s App Store 
services and could sue Apple.23 This decision ultimately created a circuit split 
with respect to this issue.24 In deciding Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Supreme Court 
resolved this circuit split and clarified antitrust liability exposure for e-
commerce, including the extent to which agreements and an internal business 
structure can insulate potential defendants from certain prospective plaintiffs.25 
Apple Inc. v. Pepper would have been even more significant had the Supreme 
Court directly addressed the issue raised by the attorney generals (“AGs”) from 
thirty-one states: Whether the doctrine of Illinois Brick, which prohibits pass-
through antitrust damages, should have been overruled?26 However, to overrule 
such an important precedent without usurping legislative authority the Supreme 
Court would have had to find that the Consumers could not maintain their 
litigation under the Illinois Brick doctrine. This could have been based on the 
fact that the Consumers were indirect purchasers of Apple’s App Store service 
and the harm they suffered was solely the result of the monopolistic premium 
being passed on to them by the App developers. After finding that the 
Consumers did not have standing under Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court would 
have been able to reconsider Illinois Brick without exceeding the court’s 
institutional constraints. However, in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Supreme Court 
found that the Consumers were direct purchasers and, consequently, the court 
did not have the appropriate opportunity to overrule Illinois Brick. Nevertheless, 
according to Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court started 
“whittling away [Illinois Brick] to a bare formalism.”27 
III. THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE AND FACTS OF APPLE INC. V. 
PEPPER 
Apple Inc. v. Pepper arose from a consumer class action lawsuit against 
Apple.28 The Consumers alleged in their complaint that they had purchased 
                                                          
 22 Id. at 1168-74. 
 23 In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 323-25 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 24 Id. at 324-25; Campos, 140 F.3d at 1174. 
 25 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019). 
 26 See Brief for Texas, Iowa, and 29 Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-204). 
 27 Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1531 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 28 Id. at 1518-19. 
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various Apps from Apple between 2007 and 2013, and they had paid too much 
for these Apps due to Apple’s monopolistic power over the App Store.29 
However, according to Apple, the Consumers were not direct purchasers of the 
App Store service and thus lacked antitrust standing under Illinois Brick; 
consequently, Apple filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted.30 The trial court granted Apple’s motion, but the 
ninth circuit reversed the dismissal on the basis that the Consumers were 
purchasing the Apps directly from Apple and thus should be regarded as “direct 
purchasers.”31 The ninth circuit’s decision created a circuit split with the eighth 
circuit, which came to the opposite conclusion in Campos v. Ticketmaster 
Corp.32 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 18, 2018, 
held oral arguments on November 26, 2018, and decided the case on May 13, 
2019.33 
The facts of Apple Inc. v. Pepper are relatively straightforward. As discussed 
above, the App Store is an interface established by Apple where users of iPhones 
can purchase Apps. The iPhone is a “closed system” where Apple controls which 
Apps can run on the system and which cannot.34 The App Store was launched 
by Apple in 2008 for users of iPhones to find and download relevant software 
for their iPhones.35 Although Apple develops some of the Apps available on the 
App Store, third-party developers create many of the Apps and Apple collects a 
30 percent commission from the payments made through the App Store for non-
Apple developed software.36 Apple also charges developers a ninety-nine dollar 
annual subscription fee and commissions on the extra content offered within the 
Apps by developers (“in-app purchases”).37 Apple also requires all the prices in 
the App Store to end in $0.99, such as $0.99, $1.99, and so forth.38 Finally, Apple 
threatens developers who distribute Apps outside of the App Store with 
suspension from the App Store and, similarly, Apple discourages customers 
from downloading Apps through other sources by voiding their respective 
iPhone warranties if they do so.39 
                                                          
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 1519; In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 31 Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1519. 
 32 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1171-72 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 33 See Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1514. 
 34 In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 315-16. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 316. 
 37 Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1519. 
 38 Brief for Respondents at 7, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-
204). 
 39 In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 315-16. 
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IV. RELATED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 
This case was brought under § 4(a) of the Clayton Act, as codified in 15 
U.S.C. § 15(a), which reads in relevant part, “any person who shall be injured in 
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws 
may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained 
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”40 Although the words 
“any person” in the statute would include anyone when read literally, they have 
been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick to encompass a direct 
purchaser requirement.41 
In Illinois Brick, the state of Illinois sued the manufacturer and distributor of 
concrete block under § 4 of the Clayton Act, alleging a conspiracy to price fix 
the block.42 Illinois Brick would manufacture and distribute concrete block 
which would be sold primarily to masonry contractors who would then submit 
bids to general contractors who in turn would submit bids to customers, such as 
the state of Illinois.43 Based on its previous decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. 
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,44 the Supreme Court ruled it would be unfair to 
allow pass-through damages to be used in an offensive manner to allow suits by 
indirect purchasers while not allowing said damages to be used in a defensive 
manner to offset damages that were passed through the supply chain.45 
Furthermore, in Illinois Brick the Supreme Court stated that by concentrating the 
recovery in the hands of the sole direct purchaser and by avoiding the 
partitioning of damages throughout the supply chain, the direct purchaser rule 
would advance the enforcement goals of § 4 of the Clayton Act.46 
Over fifty years have passed since the decision in Illinois Brick, and certain 
scholars and legal professionals still believe that it should be overturned. The 
next section of this paper analyzes whether Apple or the Consumers should 
prevail under the direct purchaser doctrine of Illinois Brick. Section VI then 
discusses the amici’s arguments for overturning or limiting the doctrine. 
V. WERE THE CONSUMERS DIRECT PURCHASERS OF APPS FROM 
APPLE? 
The crux of the dispute between Apple and the plaintiffs was whether or not 
the Consumers were direct purchasers of Apple’s services; in other words, were 
                                                          
 40 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2019). 
 41 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977). 
 42 Id. at 726-27. 
 43 Id. at 726. 
 44 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487 (1968). 
 45 Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 729. 
 46 Id. at 734-35. 
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the Apps being purchased directly from Apple?47 This question relates to the 
direct purchaser requirement under the doctrine found in Illinois Brick. 
A. Apple’s Arguments 
According to Apple, the App Store is a service being provided to the 
developers who then sell their Apps directly to the consumer through the 
developers’ usage of Apple’s distribution service.48 Based on this interpretation, 
all damages suffered by the Consumers in the case were entirely the result of the 
App developers passing Apple’s monopolistic rents downstream.49 Effectively, 
Apple believed it functioned as a consultant to the App developers and the 
purchasing of Apps involved transactions solely between the Consumers and the 
App developers. 
To argue that the Consumers were not direct purchasers of any of its products 
or services, Apple relied on: the iOS developer agreements between itself and 
the App developers, the fact that the developers ultimately set the price of the 
Apps, the eighth circuit decision in Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., and the 
policy argument against exposure to duplicative liability underlying Illinois 
Brick.50 
According to Apple, each iOS developer agreement provided that the 
developer would pay Apple the 30 percent commission based on the sales price 
of the relevant App.51 Consequently, since the fees were paid by the developers, 
the Consumers were only indirect customers of Apple’s services, and the 
relevant fees may or may not have been passed on to them through the increased 
price of the Apps. Moreover, despite the requirement that prices must end in 
$0.99, the App developers were entirely in control of how they priced their 
respective Apps.52 Importantly, in his dissent Justice Gorsuch also noted that the 
$0.99 requirement would likely prevent many of the App developers from 
passing on the price increase, since the next price that they could charge was 
$1.99.53 Based on these facts, Apple argued that whether any particular App did 
or did not include a pass-through of Apple’s monopoly premium would 
inevitably require a case by case analysis. 
                                                          
 47 See generally Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2019). 
 48 Brief for Petitioner at 35-36, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-
204). 
 49 Id. at 25-26. 
 50 Id. at 6; see Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1998); Ill. 
Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 759. 
 51 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 2–3. 
 52 Id. at 3. 
 53 Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1528 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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Furthermore, Apple noted that in Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., a case 
analogous to the dispute that was litigated in the eighth circuit, it was decided 
that consumers have no right to sue under circumstances similar to those present 
in Apple Inc. v. Pepper as a result of the direct purchaser doctrine in Illinois 
Brick.54 Finally, Apple argued that it would be unfair if both the App developers 
and the Consumers could file a claim against it for treble damages, since that 
type of hypothetical litigation would result in duplicative recovery, with each 
recovery being subject to trebling and attorney’s fees. 
B. Consumers’ Arguments 
The Consumers argued that, as far as they were concerned, they purchased 
Apps directly from Apple.55 Therefore, the Consumers considered themselves to 
be “direct purchasers” of Apps from Apple in line with Illinois Brick: 
“[Consumers] pay the monopoly prices for Apps directly to Apple through its 
App Store. Those facts make [consumers] direct purchasers of iPhone Apps who 
can sue Apple for damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act and the bright-line rule 
[the Supreme Court] adopted in Illinois Brick.”56 The Consumers further 
believed that how Apple internally structured the transactional agreements it 
entered into with the developers did not affect their rights or change the reality 
that the purchases occurred directly from Apple.57 In addition, the Consumers 
argued that the policy underlying Hanover Shoe58 requires that a party who has 
an incentive to sue be given such an opportunity and that, in the situation of 
Apple’s monopoly over Apps or App distribution services, the developers had 
never sued and were unlikely to do so.59 
The Consumers also did not consider the iOS developer agreements to have 
any effect on the economic reality of the App Store, which they regarded as a 
“two-way market.”60 According to the Consumers, Apple holds a monopoly over 
the sale of Apps while at the same time it may also hold a monopsony over the 
Apps that it purchases from developers.61 In this way, the injuries of the 
Consumers were categorically different from the injuries suffered by the 
developers. 
                                                          
 54 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 55 Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 1. 
 56 Id. at 1. 
 57 Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1522-23. 
 58 Id. at 1527 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 59 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 13. 
 60 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-
204) (referring to respondent’s arguments of Apple having two separate monopolies: one on 
the buyer side and one on the seller side). 
 61 Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1520. 
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With respect to whether Apple or the App developers controlled the price 
setting of relevant Apps, the Consumers found it difficult to distinguish their 
case from the precedent set in the Supreme Court decision of Kansas v. Utilicorp 
United, Inc.62 In Utilicorp United, the Supreme Court decided that there should 
be no exceptions to the Illinois Brick bright-line rule against allowing pass-
through damages, even in cases where the intermediary company has no 
discretion in setting price, but instead has to follow the price of the upstream 
monopolist.63 Specifically, the Supreme Court found that no cause of action 
arises when a supplier overcharges a public utility for natural gas and the public 
utility is required by law to pass on the entire overcharge to its customers.64 The 
Consumers maintained that their situation was different from the one in 
Utilicorp United because the Consumers were purchasing Apps directly from 
the monopolist rather than through an intermediary,65 as was the case in 
Utilicorp United. Furthermore, in their brief, the Consumers argued that Apple 
deprived the developers of any meaningful pricing decision as a result of Apple’s 
requirement that App prices must end in $0.99, combined with the marketplace 
reality that the vast majority of non-free Apps are priced exactly at $0.99.66 
However, at oral arguments, the Consumers backed down from their 
argument that the App developers did not have any meaningful pricing decision 
by stating that it is “irrelevant who sets the price so long as … [the monopoly] 
leads to higher prices that the consumers have to pay.”67 When pressed by Chief 
Justice Roberts, the Consumers further retreated by stating that they did not raise 
the $0.99 requirement in their complaint because they did not consider it 
significant at the time.68 The Consumers then clarified that they only added this 
fact after Apple noted it in its brief.69 Nevertheless, when questioning the 
solicitor general, Justice Kagan highlighted that the $0.99 rule can effectively 
function as a price setting mechanism.70 
With respect to the eighth circuit’s decision in Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 
the Consumers argued that Ticketmaster was decided incorrectly because the 
standard used by the court in that case was not supported by Illinois Brick.71 
Namely, the standard utilized in the Ticketmaster decision defined an indirect 
                                                          
 62 Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 206 (1990). 
 63 Id. at 201, 216. 
 64 Id. at 201. 
 65 Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 1. 
 66 Id. at 33, 52. 
 67 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 46. 
 68 Id. at 56. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 25-26. 
 71 Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 10-11. 
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purchaser as someone who “bears some portion of a monopoly overcharge only 
by virtue of an antecedent transaction between the monopolist and another, 
independent purchaser.”72 Although it would appear that under this test the 
Consumers were harmed as a result of a transaction between Apple and the App 
developers, the Consumers and the ninth circuit did not believe this 
interpretation of Illinois Brick was correct.73 
Finally, the Consumers’ response to the risk of duplicative liability was that 
the damages suffered by the Consumers and the damages suffered by the App 
developers were distinct.74 The damages of the App developers were based on 
their allegations of receiving lower profits or reduced sales; however, it is also 
hypothetically possible that the App developers benefited from the 
monopolization and in fact suffered no damages at all.75 To further illustrate how 
Apple’s monopoly could have benefitted the App developers, the Consumers 
focused on the $0.99 rule stating that “without the [$0.99] rule, competition from 
other App developers might have forced the retail price for a particular App to 
[$0.49] per App purchase rather than [$0.99].”76 Presumably, this would result 
in lower prices for the Consumers, but also a loss of profits for the App 
developers. 
During oral arguments, the question of duplicative liability and the structure 
of the transactions were major focuses of counsel for the Consumers, as well as 
many of the justices; only Justices Ginsburg and Thomas did not question the 
Consumers on these topics.77 The key pieces of the transactional argument 
related to the economic reality of the transactions and whether the damages 
between the developers and the Consumers must ultimately total the 30 percent 
commission that Apple charges for the App Store.78 Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Alito and Gorsuch were particularly concerned with the existence of 
only one monopoly rent that could be absorbed by the App developers rather 
than paid by the Consumers.79 On the other hand, Justice Kagan was more 
focused on outlining the Consumers’ argument to show that the damages 
suffered by the Consumers and the App developers were distinct.80 
                                                          
 72 Id. at 10. 
 73 Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1521-23 (2019); Brief for Respondents, supra 
note 38, at 11. 
 74 Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 2. 
 75 Id. at 2-3. 
 76 Id. at 41. 
 77 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 35-50. 
 78 Id. at 3-7, 11-13. 
 79 Id. at 38-39. 
 80 Id. at 18-19, 34-40. 
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C. The Supreme Court’s Perspectives at Oral Arguments 
Several Supreme Court justices hinted at whether they supported Apple or the 
Consumers during the questioning at oral arguments by showing a degree of 
disapproval for certain arguments made by each side. 
The Supreme Court was particularly focused on the pricing control argument 
advanced by the Consumers. Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Alito, and Kagan were concerned that the Consumers’ 
argument that Apple controlled pricing through the $0.99 rule was not 
adequately introduced at the trial court level and may not have been properly 
understood by the ninth circuit.81 Thus, they were worried that a new argument 
was being introduced at the Supreme Court level.82 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court was also concerned that if the 
Consumers were found to not have standing to sue, there would be no plaintiff 
to enforce the antitrust laws in the case.83 Justice Ginsburg asked Apple whether 
a “first purchaser” existed at all in the case, to which Apple responded, “the 
developers”; however, Justice Sotomayor interjected that “the first sale is from 
Apple to the customer. It’s the customer who pays the 30 percent.”84 Justice 
Sotomayor repeated that the money Apple collects comes directly from the 
customer, not from the developer.85 Justice Alito then noted that Apple has 
hundreds of App developers, but not one has ever chosen to sue Apple.86 Justice 
Gorsuch expressed his reservation that, despite thirty-one states asking for 
Illinois Brick to be overruled, “[Apple] is asking [the Supreme Court] to extend 
Illinois Brick.”87 In addition, Justice Gorsuch noted that “indirect purchasers 
may be more suited to enforce the antitrust laws” since “direct purchasers do not 
always sue because there is a threat that monopolists will share the rents with 
the direct purchasers.”88 
The Supreme Court also focused extensively on whether Apple is effectively 
a two-sided monopoly or whether the Consumers are sharing the absorption of 
the monopolistic premium with the App developers.89 Justice Sotomayor 
expressly stated to Apple that the Consumers are not suing for the 30 percent 
commission charged by Apple for use of the App Store, but instead are trying to 
show that lower prices are unavailable due to Apple’s monopolization of the 
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App distribution market.90 Justice Kagan also explained that there are two 
monopolies, one at the distribution level and one at the App purchase level, that 
relate to the Consumers.91 Similarly, Justice Breyer, in response to Apple’s 
argument that the payment flow makes no difference, recalled that one hundred 
years of antitrust law states that if one paid a monopolist too much money, he or 
she can collect damages, and if one is a supplier and prices were forced down, 
he or she can also collect damages.92 He further clarified that nothing in Illinois 
Brick changes that doctrine.93 However, Apple maintained that the independent 
pricing decisions of the App developers changed the situation and turned the 
Consumers into indirect purchasers.94 
The solicitor general argued on behalf of Apple and focused his arguments on 
the separation of the App developers’ pricing decisions from the alleged 
overcharging by Apple.95 Justice Kagan, as she explained previously to Apple’s 
counsel, stated that “looking at the relationship between the consumer and Apple 
… there is only one step.”96 Likewise, Justice Kavanaugh noted that Apple was 
operating as a retailer in many respects.97 
Finally, there was an underlying issue regarding the Supreme Court’s theory 
on the proximate cause requirement for standing when a statue provides “any 
person injured” with a right to sue.98 Justice Kavanaugh implied that he believes 
in ambiguous cases, such as this one, standing should be given more broadly, 
while the solicitor general raised the Supreme Court case of Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. to argue that damages, and 
therefore standing, should stop at the first step.99 In fact, it is the precise 
definition of “first step” that is at the core of any proximate cause analysis related 
to standing: “The general tendency . . . is not to go beyond the first step. What 
falls within that step depends in part on the ‘nature of the statutory cause of 
action,’ and an assessment ‘of what is administratively possible and convenient.’ 
“100 
                                                          
 90 Id. at 27-28. 
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 92 Id. at 7-8. 
 93 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 7-8. 
 94 Id. at 9. 
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VI. SHOULD ILLINOIS BRICK BE OVERRULED? 
The argument for overruling Illinois Brick was presented in the amicus brief 
authored by the AGs.101 The Supreme Court raised this argument to both Apple 
and the Consumers; however, neither side argued in favor of overruling this 
precedent.102 Apple stated that Illinois Brick is a manifestation of the proximate 
cause rule of not going past the “first step” in allowing a right to sue and is meant 
to protect defendants against potential duplicative liability on overcharge 
claims.103 The Consumers maintained their argument that they should be 
considered direct purchasers and clarified that they had “no beef with Illinois 
Brick.”104 
Despite the fact that no party argued for overruling Illinois Brick at oral 
arguments, this is still an issue that the Supreme Court could have addressed 
directly. Thirty-one state attorney generals argued for the overruling of Illinois 
Brick, and the Supreme Court has been developing its standing doctrine over the 
last several years with cases such as Lexmark and Bank of America Corp. v. City 
of Miami.105 Therefore, this case could have been a useful vehicle to further 
refine the standing doctrine as it applies to antitrust law. However, since the 
Consumers were able to prevail under the old Illinois Brick106 rule, revisiting 
Illinois Brick would have put the Supreme Court in the uncomfortable position 
of overruling precedent without needing to do so. This would then have made it 
appear as if the Supreme Court was usurping legislative authority. 
At oral arguments, Justice Gorsuch explicitly asked the Consumers why they 
were not arguing that Illinois Brick be overruled; he then asked Apple why the 
court should not reconsider Illinois Brick.107 Furthermore, Justice Breyer asked 
the Consumers about overruling other precedent.108 Nevertheless, the 
Consumers did not argue for any changes to existing precedent, which may have 
been a strategic decision that allowed them to emphasize the persuasiveness of 
their arguments under existing law.109 On the other hand, the AGs were not 
                                                          
 101 Brief for Texas, Iowa, and 29 Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
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directly concerned with who should win the case, but were instead more 
interested in a change in policy.110 
In the amicus brief submitted by the AGs, they made several arguments for 
overruling Illinois Brick. First, the AGs noted that the text of § 4(a) of the 
Clayton Act reads: “any person who shall be injured … by reason of anything 
prohibited in the antitrust laws … may sue therefor … and shall recover threefold 
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee.”111 Furthermore, the AGs explained how prior to Illinois Brick, 
the courts used to allow lawsuits by consumers for indirect damages since they 
are almost always injured by antitrust violations due to extra costs being passed 
on to them.112 Second, the AGs highlighted that since Illinois Brick was decided, 
at least thirty-five states have allowed consumers to sue for pass-through 
damages.113 They also noted that the underlying rationale that damages would 
be “virtually unascertainable” has proven to be false with the use of modern tools 
and methodologies and the courts only allowing proper evidence to be presented 
at trial.114 Third, the AGs focused on how the duplicative liability concern of 
Illinois Brick has proven to be without merit based on decades of state 
experience, during which not a single case of duplicative liability was ever 
proven.115 With respect to their third argument, the AGs described how the 
general test for remoteness in antitrust cases is a more principled basis for 
denying standing to plaintiffs that are too far removed from antitrust harm.116 
The other briefs submitted in support of Apple or the Consumers primarily 
focused on the practical effects of either overruling the Illinois Brick precedent 
or expanding upon it.117 The brief of the antitrust scholars in support of the 
Consumers mainly discussed preserving private enforcement in the area of 
antitrust and the incentives for private enforcement.118 The antitrust scholars 
were concerned that by structuring the sales transaction, Apple and future 
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companies could manipulate the direct purchaser rule in such a way as to give 
the right to sue only to the entities that are least likely to exercise this right.119 
By contrast, the United States Chamber of Commerce filed a brief in support of 
Apple focused on the practical importance of internet commerce and litigation 
potentially dampening this area of innovation.120 The United States also filed a 
brief in support of Apple. In this brief, the United States defended the Illinois 
Brick direct purchaser rule and argued that the Consumers should be considered 
“indirect purchasers.”121 The core argument advanced by the United States was 
fundamentally similar to the argument made by Apple: allowing suits by indirect 
purchasers would result in duplicative liability for monopolists.122 Furthermore, 
the United States mentioned that although “more than two-thirds of the States 
have authorized the use of pass-on analysis to apportion damages under their 
own antitrust laws … [the] regime of parallel federal and state antitrust litigation 
has proved to be complex and inefficient.”123 Finally, the United States argued 
that since the actual litigants in the case agreed on the relevant law, the only 
appropriate question for the Supreme Court was the proper application of that 
law.124 
VII. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Apple Inc. v. Pepper on May 13, 
2019.125 The Supreme Court decided 5-4 that the Consumers did have standing 
to bring suit since they are considered “direct purchasers” within the rule 
articulated in Illinois Brick.126 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion in Apple Inc. v. Pepper was authored by Justice 
Kavanaugh and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.127 
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The Supreme Court ultimately held that “the [Consumers] purchased apps 
directly from Apple and therefore are ‘direct purchasers’ under Illinois Brick.”128 
The majority based its conclusion on the language of § 2 of the Clayton Act and 
Supreme Court precedent related to the direct purchaser rule.129 The textual 
argument was based on the words “any person” in the Clayton Act, while the 
precedential argument was based on the words “the immediate buyers from 
alleged antitrust violators,” which can be found in Kansas v. Utilicorp United, 
Inc. as well as in Illinois Brick.130 To elucidate how the language of the statute 
and the two precedents support giving standing to the Consumers, the Supreme 
Court discussed the Illinois Brick decision by stating that it involved a situation 
analogous to a “manufacturer A [who] sells to retailer B, and retailer B [who] 
sells to consumer C” with the result being that B can sue A and C can sue B, but 
C cannot sue A.131 At this point, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally, “There 
is no intermediary in the distribution chain between Apple and the consumer…. 
The absence of an intermediary is dispositive.”132 After stating this conclusion, 
the Supreme Court went on to carefully address Apple’s arguments and explain 
why the Supreme Court does not consider the App developers to be an 
intermediary between Apple and the Consumers. 
The Supreme Court characterized Apple’s theory as arguing that “Illinois 
Brick allow[ed] consumers to sue only the party who sets the retail price, 
whether or not that party sells the good or service directly to the complaining 
party.”133 The Supreme Court rejected this theory for three reasons: First, 
Apple’s theory contradicted the text in both the statute and precedent, and any 
ambiguity in Illinois Brick must be resolved in the direction of the statutory text, 
which provides for suit by “any person” injured.134 Second, Apple’s theory was 
“not persuasive economically or legally” because it would create an “arbitrary 
and unprincipled” distinction “based on retailers’ financial arrangements with 
their manufacturers or suppliers.”135 
The Supreme Court went on to compare retailers’ usage of the “markup 
pricing model,” where a retailer purchases a product, marks up its price, and 
resells it to a consumer, to retailers’ usage of a “commission pricing model,” 
where a retailer pays nothing to the supplier and receives a commission only 
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when a product is sold.136 According to the Supreme Court, despite the 
distinction between the two models being immaterial, Apple’s rule would allow 
for a consumer lawsuit under the “markup pricing model” but would prohibit it 
under the “commission pricing model.”137 In addition, the Supreme Court 
appeared concerned that an “upstream arrangement between the manufacturer 
or supplier and retailer [would] determine whether a monopolistic retailer can 
be sued by a downstream consumer who has purchased a good or service directly 
from the retailer. . . .”138 Thereupon, the Supreme Court stated, “If a retailer has 
engaged in unlawful monopolistic conduct that has caused consumers to pay 
higher-than-competitive prices, it does not matter how the retailer structured its 
relationship with an upstream manufacturer or supplier. . . .”139 The court also 
expressly adopted the following rule: “If the retailer’s unlawful monopolistic 
conduct caused a consumer to pay the retailer a higher-than-competitive price, 
the consumer is entitled to sue the retailer under the antitrust laws.”140 
Finally, the Supreme Court was concerned that “if accepted, Apple’s theory 
would provide a roadmap for monopolistic retailers to structure transactions with 
manufacturers or suppliers so as to evade antitrust claims by consumers and 
thereby thwart effective antitrust enforcement.”141 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court emphatically rejected Apple’s arguments by refusing to “rubber-stamp 
such a blatant evasion of statutory text and judicial precedent.”142 
In the final section of the Supreme Court’s opinion, the court turned its 
attention back to Illinois Brick and reviewed the policy considerations 
underlying this precedent. “The Illinois Brick Court listed three reasons for 
barring indirect-purchaser suits: (1) facilitating more effective enforcement of 
antitrust laws; (2) avoiding complicated damages calculations; and (3) 
eliminating duplicative damages against antitrust defendants.”143 In terms of 
facilitating antitrust enforcement, the Apple Inc. v. Pepper court wrote, “Leaving 
consumers at the mercy of monopolistic retailers simply because upstream 
suppliers could also sue the retailers makes little sense and would directly 
contradict the longstanding goal of effective private enforcement and consumer 
protection in antitrust cases.”144 In addressing the argument related to complex 
damages calculations, the Apple Inc. v. Pepper court wrote that complexity in 
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calculating damages in not a “get-out-of-court-free card” and the damages would 
be equally complicated whether a retailer employed a commission model or a 
markup model.145 
Next, the Supreme Court explained that there was no risk of duplicative 
damages because if the Consumers prevailed, they would receive their damages 
from the overpayment that was made to Apple, and this would not amount to 
damages being apportioned up and down the supply chain.146 Although Apple 
may be subject to multiple lawsuits from different plaintiffs, this is permitted by 
Illinois Brick in cases “unrelated to passing an overcharge down a chain of 
distribution.”147 The court further emphasized that the “mere fact that an antitrust 
violation produces two different classes of victims hardly entails that their 
injuries are duplicative of one another.”148 The court then supported this 
reasoning with the example of a “bottleneck” monopolist who acts as a 
monopolist for both downstream customers and upstream suppliers and is 
therefore subject to liability on both sides of the supply chain under different 
theories.149 
B. The Dissent 
The dissent in Apple Inc. v. Pepper was written by Justice Gorsuch and joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito.150 At its core, the 
dissent believes that Illinois Brick was reinterpreted by the majority to only 
prohibit suits where the plaintiff does not contract directly with the defendant, 
thereby reducing the proximate cause analysis to a matter of contractual 
privity.151 According to the dissent, the Consumers purchased the Apps from the 
App developers, who paid Apple a 30 percent commission for usage of the App 
Store and may have then passed that commission on to the Consumers.152 This 
type of “pass-on damage” is precisely what the dissenting justices believe is 
prohibited by Illinois Brick. In this situation, the Consumers would only be 
injured if the developers were able to and choose to pass on the commission to 
the Consumers. This raises the issue of causation and would require the trial 
court to determine for each App developer whether and to what extent they 
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passed on the commission.153 This task is made even more difficult due to 
Apple’s policy that App prices must end in $0.99 and the fact that most of the 
prices are exactly $0.99.154 Furthermore, whatever Apple overcharged would 
need to be apportioned between the App developers and the Consumers. Finally, 
there is the possibility that Apple may be liable for more than the total amount 
it charged if it is subject to multiple lawsuits, which may require joining the App 
developers into one massive lawsuit.155 
Relying on the points raised by the United States and the antitrust regulators 
who argued on behalf of Apple, the dissent suggested that Illinois Brick should 
be understood as a call to examine the economic substance of a transaction rather 
than the form of who is purchasing a product.156 The dissent further explained 
that Illinois Brick used the words “direct purchasers” as shorthand to refer to 
“parties immediately injured by the monopoly overcharge” and that the majority 
misused them to fashion the rule that “anyone who purchases goods directly 
from an alleged antitrust violator can sue, while anyone who doesn’t, can’t.”157 
The dissent also focused on the fact that Apple could simply change the way the 
cash flows in a transaction to eliminate the Consumers’ standing to sue, for 
example by having the Consumers pay the App developers directly and then 
having the developers remit the commission back to Apple.158 However, 
according to the dissent, this type of contractual change is likely to be 
economically inefficient and would only be done to avoid the rule in the majority 
decision.159 
Next, the dissent questioned whether the majority opinion even supports the 
doctrine in Illinois Brick.160 “[The majority opinion] proceeds to question each 
of Illinois Brick’s rationales—doubting that those directly injured are always the 
best plaintiffs to bring suit, that calculating damages for pass-on plaintiffs will 
often be unduly complicated, and that conflicting claims to a common fund 
justify limiting who may sue.”161 The dissent also discussed the distinction 
between the mark up model and the commission model for the retailers that were 
mentioned in the majority opinion.162 In the dissenters’ opinion, the two retailer 
models are significantly different because under the markup model, the 
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overcharge falls on consumers, while in the commission model, the overcharge 
falls on the supplier who may then choose whether or not to pass on that 
overcharge.163 The dissent also argued that “the difficulty of disaggregating 
damages between those directly and indirectly harmed means that the consumer 
can’t establish proximate cause under traditional principles.”164 
Finally, the dissent noted that there is amici support for overturning the 
Illinois Brick precedent; however, the dissent stated that there was no reason to 
reconsider Illinois Brick since the plaintiffs expressly refused to argue for 
changing this precedent and this issue had not gone through the adversarial 
process.165 The lack of an adversarial process is significant because overruling 
Illinois Brick may have extensive implications, including whether the defensive 
use of pass-on damages is now permissible and whether it is necessary to join 
all of the relevant parties within the supply chain.166 
VIII. OPEN ISSUES AFTER THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Apple Inc. v. Pepper provides further 
jurisprudence in the area of proximate cause standing, creates certain rules for 
retailers, and addresses some issues in the electronic commerce marketplace.167 
However, many questions have been left unanswered by the opinion, including: 
Can there be more than one direct purchaser? Can the specific privity rule being 
applied to retailers be expanded to other areas? Does the distinction between 
retailer and supplier even make sense in the electronic marketplace environment, 
or was Illinois Brick decided for a fundamentally different economy? Are there 
any equity elements at play in this decision to prevent Apple from circumventing 
the private enforcement remedy in antitrust law?   Is the dissenting opinion 
correct that this decision is the beginning of Illinois Brick being whittled away? 
Many of these questions may have been left open to preserve the narrow 5-4 
decision and to avoid addressing issues that would further splinter the court. 
However, these open issues will inevitably resurface at the Supreme Court level 
as businesses continue to try and insulate themselves from private antitrust 
enforcement. 
                                                          
 163 Id. at 1531 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 See Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1521, 1525; Chronicle Editorial Board, Editorial: The 
Supreme Court Allows a Crucial Antitrust Test Case Against Apple, S.F. CHRON. (May 14, 
2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Editorial-The-Supreme-Court-
allows-a-crucial-13845678.php#article-comments. 
22 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 28.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
A. Is There Only One Direct Purchaser? 
One of the core rationales underlying Illinois Brick is that only one class of 
direct purchasers is entitled to sue.168 This is because, according to Illinois Brick, 
having multiple plaintiffs bringing separate actions for the same pool of money 
would potentially trigger compulsory joinder of parties.169 However, after Apple 
Inc. v. Pepper, there may be a path to argue that multiple plaintiffs may be 
“direct purchasers.”170 
The opportunity to argue for multiple “direct purchasers” exists because the 
rule created for consumers, who purchase products from a retailer, could coexist 
with a “direct purchaser” rule, which includes a “purchasers of a service” theory 
and a supplier theory. For example, according to the Consumers and the 
Supreme Court, the developers are suppliers under the commission model being 
used by Apple and the role of Apple is one of a retailer in a two-sided market.171 
However, the developers may choose to pursue a monopoly theory against Apple 
in addition to or instead of a monopsony theory. According to Apple, the App 
Store is a service sold to App developers, and the supplier of that service is the 
body of consultants and developers who made the App Store platform rather 
than the developers who create Apps sold through the App Store.172 Since Apple 
drafted the contracts in this manner, it would be difficult for it to deny that the 
developers are “direct purchasers” of the App Store service. Furthermore, a “we 
paid too much commission” claim and a “we lost profits because our prices were 
depressed” claim might be able to coexist. In the App Store scenario, the 
mandatory $0.99 price multiple requirement might cause a loss of profits 
independent from the 30 percent commission which relates to an overcharge. 
B. What Does the Privity Rule Mean for Standing Doctrine in General? 
The rule that “[t]he plaintiffs purchased apps directly from Apple and 
therefore are direct purchasers”173 provides for an analysis that looks to the 
appearance of the transaction from an ordinary person’s viewpoint rather than a 
technical, accounting, or legal understanding of contractual arrangements. This 
rule makes intuitive sense since a defendant should not be able to use contracts 
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with third parties or internal business structures to avoid liability imposed by the 
consumers of its products. This rule also follows the proximate cause 
requirements for standing recently announced in Lexmark International, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc.174 In Lexmark, the Supreme Court laid out the 
rationale for the rule that states, “The general tendency [is] not to stretch 
proximate causation beyond the first step.”175 The rationale is that “there 
ordinarily is a ‘discontinuity’ between the injury to the direct victim and the 
injury to the indirect victim, so that the latter is not surely attributable to the 
former (and thus also to the defendant’s conduct), but might instead have 
resulted from ‘any number of [other] reasons.’ “176 
The rule adopted for retailers in Apple Inc. v. Pepper appears to offer a similar 
justification as was followed in the Lexmark decision. In Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 
in contrast to Lexmark, there was no discontinuity between the injury to the 
Consumers of being overcharged for the Apps and the behavior of the 
monopolist, which makes it appear that the Consumers were “direct victims” of 
Apple’s overcharge rather than “indirect victims.”177 In this manner, the rule that 
provides standing to sue as a “direct purchaser” to a consumer who purchased 
from a retailer following a commission model may be read in terms of the 
exception created in the Lexmark decision, which dispensed with the typical 
requirement of having to be a direct competitor to maintain a Lanham Act cause 
of action.178 
The Lexmark case involved a supplier of microchips, Static Control 
Components, who made a Lanham Act false advertising claim against Lexmark 
that was based on certain advertisements claiming that refurbished printer 
cartridges were illegal.179 Typically, a Lanham Act claim can only be made by 
a direct competitor; however, the supplier of the microchips being used to 
circumvent Lexmark’s printer cartridge interoperability functionality was 
upstream from the manufacturer of the refurbished printer cartridge.180 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined that the microchip manufacturer 
had standing to sue because the microchips were both “necessary for” and “had 
no other use than, refurbishing Lexmark toner cartridges.”181 Furthermore, false 
advertising that resulted in the reduction of the business of the refurbished 
printer cartridge manufacturer also led to an injury to Static Control, since it was 
likely that there was a “1:1 relationship” between the number of refurbished 
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cartridges and the number of microchips sold by the manufacturer.182 Here, 
proximate cause was satisfied because the alleged injury was so integral to the 
alleged violation.183 
If the privity rule adopted in Apple Inc. v. Pepper is read in line with Lexmark 
rather than solely as an interpretation of Illinois Brick, there appears to be an 
additional element to the doctrine of standing that goes beyond a mechanical 
application of the “not going beyond the first step” rule in determining proximate 
cause.184 The difficulty with the progeny of Illinois Brick is the case of Kansas 
v. Utilicorp United, Inc., in which a public utility was required to pass-through 
an entire overcharge directly to its customers. 185 Despite these facts, the 
Supreme Court followed Illinois Brick literally and found no proximate cause 
and therefore denied that the plaintiffs had standing to sue.186 In Apple Inc. v. 
Pepper, the Supreme Court declared the Consumers to be direct purchasers 
despite Apple’s commission structure and it referenced Utilicorp United only 
for the premise that immediate buyers may sue the antitrust violator.187  
However, to declare the Consumers direct purchasers then reference Utilicorp 
United in support of the premise that direct purchasers can sue is rather circular. 
If the Apple Inc. v. Pepper decision is instead viewed through the prism of 
Lexmark, the reasoning of the Supreme Court becomes more apparent, but 
taking this approach leads to the conclusion that the precedential value of 
Utilicorp United should be reexamined. 
C. Does Equity Have a Role in Questions of Standing? 
During oral arguments and in its judgment, the Supreme Court appeared 
concerned that the wrongdoer would be able to structure its transactions to avoid 
legal liability through distortion of procedural law.188 At oral arguments, Justice 
Ginsburg questioned if there were in fact any “first buyers” according to 
Apple.189 Justice Alito then asked whether out of the thousands of App 
developers if any had sued Apple, to which Apple replied, “None have ever 
sued.”190 Justice Kagan noted that Apple is “able to dictate to developers 
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whatever price structure it wants, and it is able to dictate to consumers what the 
nature of the sale is going to be … it could have done a thousand other things 
that are essentially the same that would have taken it out of the Illinois Brick 
rule.”191 Justice Gorsuch was concerned that the Supreme Court was “in danger 
of just incentivizing a restructuring of contracts here so that all that Apple does 
or people like it is make you purchase directly from the app provider and then it 
returns … the profit to Apple later[.]”192 
The Supreme Court expressly stated that Apple’s theory, if adopted by the 
court, would be “a roadmap for monopolistic retailers to structure transactions 
with manufacturers or suppliers so as to evade antitrust claims by consumers and 
thereby thwart effective antitrust enforcement.”193 Furthermore, the court stated 
that it would not “green-light monopolistic retailers to exploit their market 
position” by helping insulate them from antitrust suits by consumers.194 Even 
when analyzing the reasoning behind Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court wrote, 
“Illinois Brick is not a get-out-of-court-free card for monopolistic retailers to 
play any time that a damages calculation might be complicated.”195 
The above reasoning relied on by the Supreme Court does not appear to be 
entirely detached from concepts of equity or fairness. There is a distinct concern 
that Apple might be intentionally “gaming the system” with its contracts or 
internal structure in order to avoid a private enforcement action despite 
monopolistically overcharging consumers.196 This concern seems to have also 
been present in the Lexmark case, where Lexmark was using false advertising 
against a manufacturer of a key component of a competing product rather than 
using false advertising against its direct competitor.197 This indirect 
consideration of fairness seems reasonable given the precedent in Lexmark as 
well as the opinion in Apple Inc. v. Pepper. Moreover, despite both of these 
Supreme Court opinions being phrased, in part, as interpretations of prior 
precedent, the resulting carve outs and special rules point toward a more flexible 
approach. 
D. Are E-Commerce Supply Chains Inherently Dynamic? 
In 1937, Ronald H. Coase wrote his celebrated paper “The Nature of the 
Firm,” in which he laid out the fundamental economic reasons behind the 
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organization of economic activities within enterprises.198 According to Coase, 
firms ultimately exist to minimize transaction costs, with the largest transaction 
cost being the cost of obtaining information on prices.199 With the electronic 
economy, this cost has greatly decreased and resulted in supply chains that are 
highly fragmented and dynamic. In reality, the electronic commerce supply 
chain is different, dynamic, and redefined in its very essence when compared to 
the traditional supply chains that existed in the era of Hanover Shoe or Illinois 
Brick.200 The modern era is the era of Lexmark and Apple Inc. v. Pepper. 
In the supply chain of the electronic marketplace, the traditional concept of 
an enterprise utilizing direct materials, direct labor, indirect materials, indirect 
labor, and manufacturing overhead for the purpose of producing an output to be 
sold downstream is being challenged. The upstream and downstream are flexible 
and subject to definitions that can be manipulated for legal purposes. The 
doctrine of proximate cause is one area of the law where this manipulation has 
become quite evident. In Lexmark, the proximate cause issue related to a 
microchip manufacturer that was producing microchips that were being used 
downstream by a printer cartridge remanufacturer competing with Lexmark.201 
The issue was that the microchip manufacturer was further upstream in the 
supply chain for printer cartridges and, therefore, did not fit the traditional 
definition of a “competitor.”202 However, the Supreme Court created an 
exception in order to include this type of upstream supplier within the scope of 
persons entitled to sue under the Lanham Act.203 
In Apple Inc. v. Pepper, a “retailer” created an internal structure and then 
claimed it was simply providing a service to the developers and hence was two 
steps upstream from consumers.204 In this situation, the Supreme Court decided 
that there needed to be a safe harbor rule to provide standing to anyone who is 
directly purchasing a product from a monopolist retailer, without regard to the 
other arrangements that the monopolist retailer created.205 
Beyond the individual exceptions mentioned above, the Supreme Court has 
altered the doctrine of proximate standing in a way that provides standing to a 
broader range of plaintiffs. First, with Lexmark, the Supreme Court changed the 
doctrine of standing from a prudential doctrine to one of statutory 
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construction.206 This change made it easier for the legislature to expressly 
broaden standing as needed, since the doctrine of standing was no longer being 
controlled by the courts but by statutory drafting and construction. With Apple 
Inc. v. Pepper, the doctrine of standing is now moving further toward an ad-hoc 
analysis based on principles, such as whether the consumer bought the product 
from the monopolist or not, without respect to the underlying legalistic structure 
of the transaction.207 
The path of old economic assumptions being manipulated for the purpose of 
accommodating modern, dynamic supply chains is currently undergoing a 
transition through the creation of exceptions to old rules. However, the old rules 
must and will be replaced by a more dynamic understanding of modern 
commerce. With electronic commerce, intermediaries can be easily created or 
destroyed for the purpose of using proximate cause standing doctrine to 
circumvent private enforcement rights. For example, a large retailer can contract 
with micro-retailers for identical terms and commissions. It can then require 
those retailers to use identical portals and websites with simple, hidden 
disclaimers stating that those micro-retailers are not directly affiliated with the 
large retailer. In fact, such arrangements can be made invisible to end users or 
to consumers in general. Similarly, intermediaries can simply be created 
upstream with companies that aggregate suppliers or they can act as brokers for 
the services provided by the relevant supplier. In each of these cases, the 
Supreme Court may find that the particular corporate or contractual structure at 
issue does not defeat proximate cause with the plaintiff. However, creating these 
doubts and unnecessary litigation tends to favor the monopolist over the smaller 
supplier or the consumers as a whole. Furthermore, this uncertainty creates a 
market for these types of convoluted supply chains that serve the primary 
purpose of providing litigation insurance rather than economic efficiency. 
Therefore, a more dynamic understanding of proximate cause standing doctrine 
that is untethered to old supply chain concepts is necessary to maintain effective 
private enforcement rights. Fortunately, Lexmark and Apple Inc. v. Pepper are 
major steps forward in the development of such an understanding. 
E. What Remains of the Illinois Brick Direct Purchaser Rule? 
In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch observed that perhaps the majority of the 
Supreme Court disagrees with Illinois Brick because it created a new rule and 
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the rationales underlying Illinois Brick are questionable.208 The problem for the 
majority in Apple Inc. v. Pepper was that the plaintiffs did not call for Illinois 
Brick to be overruled, so the court was deprived of the opportunity to argue the 
benefits and drawbacks of Illinois Brick with the litigants.209 Furthermore, 
overruling such longstanding precedent based on an amicus brief supplied by 
the AGs would have put the court in the position of being overly proactive and 
going beyond what was necessary to resolve a dispute among litigants. It is for 
these reasons that it is worth considering whether the Illinois Brick direct 
purchaser rule continues to be the bright-line rule for the proximate cause 
analysis in antitrust litigation. 
After the Supreme Court decision in Lexmark, it may be worthwhile to 
reconsider all prior proximate cause jurisprudence, as the relevant decisions are 
based on fundamentally different theoretical underpinnings. The concept of 
prudential standing is based on maintaining the legitimacy of the judiciary and 
creating a method of avoiding cases that are more properly suited for other 
branches of government.210 However, the doctrine of prudential standing 
brought about the uncomfortable contradiction of a court refusing to hear a case 
squarely within its jurisdiction based solely on “prudential” considerations. The 
Lexmark decision resolved this issue by making the proximate cause 
requirement of standing a component of statutory construction.211 This change 
made the standing question less about whether there are reasons for the court not 
to hear a case in order to preserve institutional integrity,212 and more about 
whether standing is appropriate to serve the legislative purpose underlying the 
relevant private cause of action. Therefore, given the dynamic nature of the 
modern economy and the recent theoretical transformation of standing doctrine 
at the Supreme Court, it is highly likely that Illinois Brick and its rules will 
continue to be weakened in the future. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Apple Inc. v. Pepper provided the Supreme Court with the unique opportunity 
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to decide a case with direct and substantial implications for the entire United 
States and, perhaps, the world economy. However, despite the very broad issues 
presented in this case, it is also imperative to remember that this was a case 
between two litigants. Furthermore, one must also recognize that the Supreme 
Court is primarily responsible for resolving disputes, not formulating antitrust 
policy.213 This institutional constraint, along with the narrow margin of a 5-4 
decision, resulted in a decision that left many crucial questions open for future 
litigation. 
On the narrow question of whether the Consumers were direct purchasers, the 
Justices of the Supreme Court ruled for the Consumers. The majority ultimately 
adopted a rule that states if consumers purchase goods or services directly from 
a retailer, they are considered “direct purchasers.”214 This rule appears to be a 
compromise made to address some of the major concerns that were presented 
during the oral arguments. During these arguments, the justices focused 
primarily on two areas of the dispute: First, whether treating the Consumers as 
indirect purchasers would prevent adequate enforcement of antitrust laws. 
Second, whether treating the Consumers as direct purchasers would potentially 
result in duplicative or inconsistent judgments against Apple.215 The first 
concern was not adequately addressed by Apple, and it is a concern that has been 
expressly discussed by justices in the past, specifically by the late Justice 
Antonin Scalia in his paper “The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element 
of the Separation of Powers.”216 In that article, Justice Scalia prudently noted 
that if no one has the power to enforce a certain right, then the right will not be 
enforced.217 It is likely that this concern was the core reason why the Supreme 
Court ultimately sided with the Consumers. 
On another note, the court’s concern with duplicative liability appeared to be 
assuaged by the Consumers’ argument that the App developers suffered a 
fundamentally different injury than the Consumers. The court also appeared to 
be swayed by the fact that damages would not necessarily total the 30 percent 
that Apple charges for App Store usage. Moreover, Justice Kagan in particular 
outlined the Consumers’ arguments and appeared to be persuaded by them.218 
The argument that the injuries suffered by the Consumers and the App 
                                                          
 213 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 214 Hovenkamp, supra note 170. 
 215 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1524 (2019). 
 216 See generally Scalia, supra note 18, at 897 (discussing the judicial doctrine of 
standing relating to the plaintiff’s alleged injury). 
 217 Id. at 896. 
 218 Tucker Higgins, Supreme Court Appears Skeptical of Apple’s Arguments in App 
Store Monopoly Case, CNBC (Nov. 26, 2018, 3:48 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/11/26/supreme-court-appears-skeptical-of-apples-arguments-in-app-store-monopoly-
case.html. 
30 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 28.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
developers were of a fundamentally different nature was raised extensively in 
the majority opinion. This appears to be the only answer the court provided to 
address Apple’s concern about being exposed to multiplicative liability and 
litigation from various plaintiffs. 
With respect to overturning Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court was interested 
in reevaluating this precedent at oral arguments, likely because it is related to its 
recent reconsideration of standing doctrine in general.219 The court even 
expressly raised the idea that it might be willing to overrule its precedent in 
Illinois Brick; however, the Consumers never argued for a change in precedent 
and persistently contended that they should be considered direct purchasers 
under the Illinois Brick rule.220 This put the Supreme Court in a difficult position 
as it attempted to clarify the Illinois Brick precedent in such a manner as to 
include the Consumers’ litigation within the proximate cause analysis. 
Consequently, it appears that Illinois Brick is disfavored by the Supreme Court 
at this time. Nevertheless, for the court to have explicitly overruled Illinois 
Brick, it would have had to make that decision sua sponte and in spite of the fact 
that no litigant argued in favor of doing so. Overruling Illinois Brick would not 
only have resulted in the amici taking over the case, but it would have also forced 
the Supreme Court to make policy rather than resolve a dispute between two 
litigants. That role of the Supreme Court is even less justified under the current 
Lexmark framework of proximate cause standing, where said standing is now an 
element of statutory construction. Under this framework, the legislature may 
always modify proximate cause standing limitations through legislation, and it 
should be given the first opportunity to do so. 
In the end, the Consumers’ arguments that they purchased the Apps from 
Apple and that the internal structure of Apple’s relationship with the App 
developers should not affect the rights of the Consumers remain highly 
persuasive. However, the arguments advanced by the Consumers and the 
intuitive understanding of how a consumer purchases an application do not fit 
within the narrow bounds of the supply chain paradigm envisioned by Illinois 
Brick and Hanover Shoe. Electronic commerce involves a decentralized and 
dynamic supply chain that does not follow traditional notions of direct 
competitor, supplier, or customer.221 This reality of the modern marketplace has 
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resulted in litigation such as Lexmark and Apple Inc. v. Pepper.  Although these 
cases have been resolved through narrow carve outs from traditional rules, it is 
inevitable that the traditional rules will eventually be abandoned in their entirety. 
These rules will then be replaced by a dynamic system that accounts for the 
modern business reality and shifts away from old assumptions about large, 
stable, and immutable enterprises. Ultimately, antitrust law will continue to 
adapt and move toward a more Coasian view of enterprises, in which enterprises 
are considered to be organizations of transactions that change rapidly in scope, 






























                                                          
Intermediation, WILEY ONLINE LIBR. (June 23, 2006), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ 
doi/full/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2000.tb00343.x. 
32 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 28.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
